Some conditionalists believe that when a person dies, he ceases to exist and is then later resurrected to be judged.  But this is a problem.  Please consider these quotes from conditionalists, also known as annihilationists.

• “The first man was created when the dust of the earth and the breath of God were brought together (Gen 2: 7), and just as surely as the man did not exist prior to creation, he does not exist when the spirit returns to God who gave it and the dust returns to the earth (Eccl 12:7).”¹Peoples, Glen, A., Rethinking Hell: Readings in Evangelical Conditionalism (Kindle Locations 583-586). Cascade Books, an Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition. Underline added
• “While one may continue to “live” in one’s name or progeny, viewed as a corporate extension of one’s own soul, there is no longer any personal life or being. The “spirit [that] returns to God who gave it” (Eccl 12: 7) is not, as Platonists read it, a part of the individual’s personality, much less his essential ego, but rather the “spirit of life” (Gen 7: 22; cf. 2: 7) that God grants and, at death, takes back (e.g., Job 34: 14f.).²Ellis, E. Earle, Rethinking Hell: Readings in Evangelical Conditionalism, Kindle Locations 2913-2919. Cascade Books, an Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition. The bracketed word [that] is original to the quote. Underline added
• “When death occurs, then it is the soul that is deprived of life. Death cannot strike the body or any other part of the soul without striking the entirety of the soul.”³Fudge, Edward William. The Fire That Consumes: A Biblical and Historical Study of the Doctrine of Final Punishment, Third Edition (p. 27). Cascade Books, an imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

The first quote above states that the person, upon death, ceases to exist.  The second quote states that the spirit of life in the person is taken back to God.  The third says that the soul has no life in it.  This can only mean that upon death, the human person ceases to have existence.  He is nothing.

Continuity and the personal identity problem

In regard to people, continuity deals with the continuous existence of a person through time. Personal Identity deals with who a person is, his memories, self-awareness, characteristics, essence, etc. So, for example, let’s say there is a person who committed a crime 20 years ago, is caught, and goes to trial. Is he the same person he was 20 years ago? Is his Personal Identity the same during those 20 years? Is he now the same person he was back then? These questions relate to the continuity of a person through time. The Personal Identity of a man 20 years ago is equal to the Personal Identity of a man today if there has been unbroken continuity during those 20 years. In other words, he is the same person only if he has been continuously alive during those 20 years. Therefore, the Personal Identity of the man has been carried through those 20 years, second by second, day by day, year by year, unbroken and complete. Accordingly, continuity, which is the continued existence of something from one moment in time to another, supports that the notion that the person who committed a crime 20 years ago is the same person today and can, therefore, be held accountable for his crime.

But what if he dies and, in the context of our discussion, ceases to exist? Does his Personal Identity also cease to exist? The conditionalist who holds to the nonexistence of the human soul after physical death must assert that the individual’s Personal Identity has ceased. But, such conditionalists who state that a person dies and ceases to exist and is subsequently resurrected face a logical problem. There is no continuity. Therefore, the issue of the person being the actual same person and not an exact copy is a logical challenge.

Chair 1 and Chair 2

If I were to take a large tree trunk and cut out 50 pieces of wood out of it and made a chair, then I would have a chair. If I were to then destroy that chair by burning it in a fire, it is now gone. It is not there. It is “extinct.” If I then cut out another 50 pieces of wood that are exactly identical to the previous 50 and I then made another chair that is exactly equal to the first, is the second chair actually the first chair? No, it is not. The second chair is the same as the first in appearance, weight, mass, but it is not the first chair. It is a different chair. It is a duplicate. But, a duplicate is not the same chair. Chair 2 is not Chair 1. It is a copy. It is a different chair even though it has an identical appearance and properties.

Let me illustrate with Table 1

Table 1
Chair 1 Existence	Nonexistence	Chair 2 Existence
Is the first chair…	…actually…	…the second chair?

I hope you see the problem.  It cannot be maintained that Chair 1 is actually Chair 2 because the continuity is lost.

Continuity and personhood

Let’s apply this issue of continuity to the issue of the conditionalist’s view of a human person who exists, does not exist, then exists again.  Consider Table 2.

Table 2
Person 1 Created	Nonexistence	Person 2 “resurrected”
Is person 1…	…actually…	…person 2?

When the conditionalists say that a person ceases to exist and then is resurrected by God, we have to ask if such an assertion makes any sense. Is the second person, actually the first person?  It would not appear so.

But conditionalists tend to respond by saying that the person really is resurrected. Therefore, it is the same person. But, saying that God resurrects a person doesn’t address the issue that I have raised here. Furthermore, it would be begging the question to say that this so-called “resurrection” that God has upon a person somehow means it is the exact same person – considering the continuity problem I’ve presented.

Another response from some conditionalists is to say that God can do anything.  Therefore, he can reconstruct/resurrect the actual person.  Consider the following quote from a well-known annihilationist, Edward Fudge.

“The nature of the human creature does not determine the outcome in our debate. Dualists, who teach that the soul consciously survives the death of the body (dualism), acknowledge that God is able to destroy both soul and body in hell if he so desires. Monists, who deny that a disembodied soul consciously survives physical death, acknowledge that God is able to resurrect the wicked in immortality if he so desires.”⁴Fudge, Edward William. The Fire That Consumes: A Biblical and Historical Study of the Doctrine of Final Punishment, Third Edition (p. 367). Cascade Books, an imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers. Kindle Edition.

Just saying that God can resurrect the wicked if he so desires – when that so-called resurrection is from nonexistence – doesn’t mean it is true. Nowhere in scripture is such an assertion made. People don’t realize that God cannot do everything. He cannot lie, stop being God, make round squares, or do the logically impossible. The conditionalists God-can-do-anything” response is insufficient.

Let’s step even further into this issue

I’d like to add more to the Table to further illustrate the problem with this particular view we are examining.

Table 3
Logical Condition 1	Logical Condition 2	Logical Condition 3	Logical Condition 4
Nonexistence	Existence: Person 1	Nonexistence	Existence: Person 2
No properties Nothing No essence	Human properties Exists Human essence	No properties Nothing No essence	Human properties Exists Human essence
Nonexistence is identical…		…to nonexistence

Is Logical Condition 1 is exactly identical to Logical Condition 3 in every way?  Yes, because nonexistence is nothing. It has no characteristics and no properties. It’s simply nothing.  If the two Logical Conditions are identical in every way, then they are the same thing.

But, if Logical Condition 2 and Logical Condition 4 are separated by Logical Condition 3 (nonexistence), there is no continuity between the persons in Logical Condition 2 and 4.  If Logical Condition 3 is nonexistence, the same as Logical Condition 1, then how is the Person 1 (Logical Condition 2) the same as Person 2 (Logical Condition 4)?  Remember, Person 1 is a new creation preceded by Nonexistence.  Person 2 is also preceded by nonexistence.  Person 1 is a new creation.  Why then isn’t Person 2 also a new creation since both are preceded by exactly the same thing:  nonexistence?

The conditionalist will again say that Person 2 is actually Person 1 because it is a resurrection. But then again, that is begging the question and we are back to where we started with the problem of continuity and personal identity.

Conclusion

There is a problem with the conditionalists position that a person stops existing and then becomes existing again. Though the conditionalist must reject my analysis because of his presuppositions, such rejection does not mean my argument is invalid. I’ve presented something here that is a problem and if it cannot be answered, then it stands. In my opinion, this demonstrates a weakness in the conditionalist position which says that soul sleep is equivalent to nonexistence.

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